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ABSTRACT
Patients with Parkinson’s disease (PD) are often treated with dopaminergic medication.
Dopaminergic medication is known to improve both motor and certain nonmotor symptoms,
such as depression. However, it can contribute to behavioral impairment, for example, by
enhancing risky choice. Here we characterize the computational mechanisms that contribute
to dopamine-induced changes in risky choice in PD patients with and without a depression
(history). We adopt a clinical–neuroeconomic approach to investigate the effects of
dopaminergic medication on speciﬁc components of risky choice in PD. Twenty-three
healthy controls, 21 PD patients with a depression (history), and 22 nondepressed PD
patients were assessed using a well-established risky choice paradigm. Patients were tested
twice: once after taking their normal dopaminergic medication and once after withdrawal
of their medication. Dopaminergic medication increased a value-independent gambling
propensity in nondepressed PD patients, while leaving loss aversion unaffected. By contrast,
dopaminergic medication effects on loss aversion were associated with current depression
severity and with drug effects on depression scores. The present ﬁndings demonstrate that
dopaminergic medication increases a value-independent gambling bias in nondepressed PD
patients. Moreover, the current study raises the hypothesis that dopamine-induced reductions
in loss aversion might underlie previously observed comorbidity between depression and
medication-related side effects in PD, such as impulse control disorder.
INTRODUCTION
Parkinson’s disease (PD) is a neurodegenerative disorder characterized by, among other things,
degeneration of dopaminergic neurons leading to striatal dopamine depletion. PD patients
exhibit motor and certain nonmotor symptoms, which can be alleviated (to some extent) by
dopaminergic medication. However, the effects of dopaminergic medication on cognitive and
decision functions are more complex (Robbins & Cools, 2014).
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Work with experimental animals, healthy volunteers, and PD patients revealed that
dopaminergic medication enhances risky choice (Brand et al., 2004; Cools, Barker, Sahakian,
& Robbins, 2003; Euteneuer et al., 2009; Rutledge, Skandali, Dayan, & Dolan, 2015; St. Onge,
Chiu, & Floresco, 2010; St. Onge & Floresco, 2009). In PD, these side effects can contribute
to severe psychiatric abnormalities, including drug and gambling addiction (Weintraub et al.,
2010). However, both the nature and extent of these psychiatric abnormalities vary greatly
across patients. For example, although all patients receive dopaminergic medication, impulse
control disorder (ICD) occurs only in a subset (∼ 10% − 15%; Weintraub et al., 2010). In
keeping with this clinical variability, we know that there is also large individual variability in
the nature and extent of dopaminergic drug effects on cognitive and decision functions (e.g.,
Cools & D’Esposito, 2011). Here we aimed to characterize the mechanisms that contribute
to individual variability in medication-induced changes in risky choice in PD. To this end,
we adopted a controlled medication withdrawal procedure to assess effects of dopaminergic
medication on a well-established risky choice paradigm in PD.
We asked two speciﬁc questions, which were inspired by a number of apparently dis-
crepant observations. First, we asked whether the extent to which dopaminergic medication
increases risky choice in PD depends on the presence of depression (history), a frequent non-
motor symptom of PD. This question was raised by clinical observations that ICDs are often
comorbid with depression (Joutsa, Martikainen, Vahlberg, Voon, & Kaasinen, 2012; Voon,
Sohr et al., 2011). Based on this literature, dopamine-induced increases in risky choice might
be expected to be greater in PD patients with than without a depression (history).
This prediction, however, contrasts with an alternative hypothesis, derived from the
dopamine overdose account, which states that dopamine-induced deﬁcits reﬂect detrimental
overdosing of dopamine levels in relatively unaffected brain regions, such as the ventral stria-
tum (Cools, 2006; Cools, Barker, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2001; Swainson et al., 2000). Based
on evidence that depression in PD is accompanied by disproportionately reduced ventral stri-
atal dopamine (Remy, Doder, Lees, Turjanski, & Brooks, 2005; Vriend et al., 2013; Weintraub
et al., 2005), we might predict dopamine-induced increases in risky choice to be greater in
nondepressed than in depressed PD patients. Our design allowed us to disentangle these two
contrasting hypotheses.
Our second question was which computational mechanisms contribute to drug-induced
increases in risky choice. To decompose drug effects on risky choice, we employed a com-
putational modeling approach based on prospect theory, one of the more successful accounts
of decision making under risk (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984). Unlike model-free anal-
yses of choice patterns, this model-based approach enabled us to disentangle two different
mechanistic hypotheses regarding the nature of drug effects.
The ﬁrst mechanistic hypothesis was inspired by recent theorizing and empirical evi-
dence indicating a key role for striatal dopamine in the relative weighting of reward versus
punishment on learning and choice (Collins & Frank, 2014). Thus one mechanism by which
dopaminergic medication may increase risky choice is by attenuating loss aversion, which re-
ﬂects our tendency to weigh losses more than equally sized gains. Loss aversion is one of the
core concepts of prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984, 1979). In the domain of learn-
ing, studies with healthy volunteers and PD patients have demonstrated repeatedly that the bal-
ance between learning from reward and punishment depends critically on striatal dopamine
(Cools, Altamirano, & D’Esposito, 2006; Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004; van der Schaaf
et al., 2014). Increases in dopamine enhance reward-based relative to punishment-based
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learning, while decreases in dopamine enhance punishment-based relative to reward-based
learning. Recent theoretical work extends these value-dependent effects from learning to
choice (Collins & Frank, 2014), and empirical evidence has indeed demonstrated that dopami-
nergic medication in PD alters reward- versus punishment-based choice in ways very similar
to its effects on learning (Shiner et al., 2012; Smittenaar et al., 2012). Here we aimed to in-
vestigate whether dopaminergic medication alters risky choice in PD in an analogous manner,
by increasing the relative weighting of rewards (gains) versus punishments (losses), thereby
attenuating loss aversion.
A second mechanism by which dopaminergic medication might affect risky choice is
by altering the tendency to gamble in a value-independent manner. This is based on recent
studies with healthy volunteers revealing that levodopa increases risky choice by increasing
the propensity to gamble regardless of the gamble values at stake (Rigoli et al., 2016; Rutledge,
Skandali, Dayan, & Dolan, 2015).
To address our two speciﬁc questions, we adopted a two-step approach. First, we as-
sessed whether dopamine-induced increases in risky choice, as observed previously in non-
depressed PD (Brand et al., 2004; Cools et al., 2006; Euteneuer et al., 2009), can best be
accounted for by decreases in loss aversion and/or increases in a value-independent gambling
bias. To this end, we assessed medication effects on prospect theory–derived parameters,
representing loss aversion and gambling bias, from choice patterns on the risky choice task
obtained from a psychiatrically clean group of PD patients without depression. Second, we
assessed whether effects of dopaminergic medication on risky choice computations vary as a
function of (individual differences in the current severity of) depression.
METHODS
Participants and Experimental Design
We recruited 23 nondepressed PD patients, 24 PD patients with a depression (history), and
25 healthy controls. Data from one nondepressed PD patient, three PD patients with a depres-
sion (history), and two healthy controls were discarded from the analyses (see “Exclusion”).
The ﬁnal analysis included 22 nondepressed PD patients, 21 PD patients with a depression
(history), and 23 healthy controls.
Patients were recruited from the Parkinson Centre at the Radboud University Medical
Centre, the Netherlands. Healthy controls were recruited via advertisement or were partners
or acquaintances of patients. Healthy controls and patients were matched for gender, age,
and IQ measured with the Dutch version of the National Adult Reading Test (NART; Schmand,
Bakker, Saan, & Louman, 1991). Patient groups were matched in terms of disease severity,
measured with the Uniﬁed Parkinson’s Disease Rating Scale, Part III (UPDRS–III; Goetz &
Stebbins, 2004) and used similar amounts of dopaminergic medication, levodopa equivalent
dose (LED; Esselink et al., 2004; Table 1). Written informed consent according to the Decla-
ration of Helsinki was obtained from all participants. The study was part of a larger project
investigating the neurobiological mechanisms of depression in PD and was approved by the
local ethics committee (Commissie Mensgebonden Onderzoek regio Arnhem–Nijmegen, the
Netherlands, nr. 2012/43).
All patients were diagnosed with idiopathic PD according to the U.K. Brain Bank criteria
(Gibb & Lees, 1988) by a neurologist specialized in movement disorders (Prof. B. R. Bloem,
Dr. R. A. Esselink, Dr. B. Post) and were treated with dopaminergic medication. In the non-
depressed group, 11 patients were treated with levodopa, 2 were treated with dopamine
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Table 1. Group characteristics
PD with a
depression
(history) Nondepressed PD Healthy controls
n = 21 n = 22 n = 23
Gender, men 13 13 14
Age (years) 58.5 (5.8) 61.0 (7.6) 60.9 (5.9)
NART-IQ 96.2 (11.6) 97.0 (15.5) 100.7 (13.7)
MMSE 28.5 (1.4) 28.6 (1.3) 28.8 (1.2)
Hoehn & Yahr 1.6 (0.4) 1.8 (0.5) –
UPDRS–III (OFF) 22.7 (9.6) 22.2 (6.5) –
Disease duration (years) 5.1 (3.5) 4.5 (2.2) –
LED (mg/day) 551 (248) 627 (275) –
LED agonists (mg/day) 71 (122) 103 (129) –
BDI (OFF) 9.9 (6.1) 4.0 (2.3) 3.1 (2.1)
Current ICD 4 1 –
First session ON 11 9 –
Days between sessions 23 (27) 21 (20) –
Endowment OFF session 11.20 (1.08) 10.52 (1.69) 11.36 (1.76)
Endowment ON session 11.28 (1.25) 11.26 (1.42) –
Note. Values represent numbers or mean (standard deviation).
receptor agonists, and 9 were treated with both. In the group of PD patients with a depression
(history), 14 patients were treated with levodopa, 2 were treated with dopamine receptor ag-
onists, and 5 were treated with both. Patients were on stable medication regimes during the
course of the study, except for one patient, who used duloxetine—a serotonin/noradrenalin
reuptake inhibitor prescribed to treat pain—for 4 weeks between the 2 testing days (in this
case, testing days were separated by 17 weeks). The drug was discontinued 4 weeks before
the second testing day. Seven patients in the patient group with a depression (history) received
antidepressants (paroxetine, n = 3; escitalopram, n = 1; venlafaxine, n = 1; and nortriptyline,
n = 2).
Patients were included in the depression (history) group if they met the DSM-IV crite-
ria for any of the various depression-related diagnoses in the DSM-IV within a timeframe of
5 years before PD diagnosis up until the present. This 5-year cutoff was chosen because the
incidence of depression is signiﬁcantly higher within the 5 years before PD diagnosis (Shiba
et al., 2000). These depressive episodes are therefore more likely related to PD pathology.
Seven patients were diagnosed with a major depressive episode (3 past, 4 current), 12 with a
minor depressive episode (9 past, 3 current), 1 with a past dysthymic disorder, and 1 with a
past adjustment disorder with depressed mood. Thus note that the patient group with a de-
pression (history) consisted of patients with both past (n = 14) and current (n = 7) depression.
This heterogeneity allowed us to speciﬁcally assess dopaminergic medication effects on risky
choice parameters as a function of current depression severity. Indeed, only seven patients
were identiﬁed as being depressed at the time of testing. As such, any conclusions regard-
ing the effects of depression across the group of patients with depression (history) should be
interpreted as reﬂecting effects of either current or past depression. Psychiatric diagnosis was
based on structured psychiatric interviews administered during an intake session (MINI-plus;
Sheehan et al., 1998). General exclusion criteria were clinical dementia (Mini Mental State
Examination [MMSE] < 24; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975), psychiatric disorders other
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than depression (bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, attention-deﬁcit hyperactivity disorder, or
drug or alcohol abuse), neurological comorbidity, and hallucinations. Healthy controls were
also excluded if they had a history of mood or anxiety disorder or a history of obsessive-
compulsive disorder or if they used any psychotropic medication.
Patients were assessed on two occasions: once after taking their normal dopaminergic
medication (ON) and once after abstaining from their dopaminergic medication for at least
18 hours (24 hours for slow-release dopamine receptor agonists; OFF). Antidepressants were
taken on both testing days, enabling us to assess speciﬁcally dopaminergic medication effects
on gambling behavior. The order of ON andOFF sessions was counterbalanced in each patient
group (Table 1). Healthy controls were only tested once. During testing sessions, we adminis-
tered the gambling task described herein. Furthermore, on each testing day, participants com-
pleted the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Erbaugh, Ward, Mock, &Mendelsohn, 1961)
to assess current depressive symptoms. Participants were instructed to answer BDI questions
according to how they felt over the past 24 hours (rather than the past week), enabling us to as-
sess dopaminergic drug (withdrawal) effects on depression scores. Patients also completed the
Questionnaire for Impulsive-Compulsive Disorders in Parkinson’s Disease-Rating Scale
(QUIP-RS; Weintraub et al., 2012) developed to assess ICD symptoms in PD, and the
UPDRS–III was administered to assess clinical motor symptom severity (Goetz & Stebbins,
2004).
Participants were paid a ﬁxed amount per testing day for participation (healthy controls,
e30; patients, e40) and received an additional amount of money based on task performance
(between e2 and e11 per session; see later).
Task
Participants played a well-validated gambling task designed to measure loss aversion (Tom,
Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007; Figure 1). During this task, participants were presented with
169 mixed gambles (split into three runs) on a computer screen. Each gamble offered a
50− 50 chance of either gaining or losing varying amounts of money. Potential gains ranged
from +e6 to +e30 (increments of e2), while potential losses ranged from −e3 to −e15
(increments of e1). This asymmetric gain–loss range was chosen to maximize statistical power,
based on the assumption that on average, people are twice as sensitive to losses as they are
to gains (Tom et al., 2007). Each of the possible gain–loss pairs (13 × 13 = 169) was pre-
sented once in randomized order. Participants were asked either to accept (play) or to reject
the gamble by pressing one of two buttons. To make participants feel that they were gambling
with their own money, and thus avoid “house money effects” (Thaler & Johnson, 1990), en-
dowments at the beginning of this gambling task were earnings from a behavioral experiment
immediately preceding the present experiment on the same day. Gambles were not resolved
during the experiment to exclude trial-by-trial behavioral adjustments based on previous earn-
ings. However, to ensure that participants would take each gamble seriously, at the end of the
experiment, three gambles were randomly selected and played for real money.
ANALYSIS
Model
We used a model-based approach to analyze participants’ choice behavior. This procedure
involved ﬁtting a theoretical model of decision making to behavioral data to quantify spe-
ciﬁc aspects of choice behavior. One of the most popular accounts of decision making under
risk is prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). We sought to understand the effects of
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Figure 1. Task overview. Participants played a gambling task designed to measure loss aversion.
During this task, participants were presented with 169mixed gambles, each offering a 50/50 chance
of either gaining or losing varying amounts of money. Gains ranged from +e6 to +e30 (increments
of e2); losses ranged from −e3 to −e15 (increments of e1; see gain–loss matrix). Each possible
gain–loss pair was presented once in randomized order. Participants were asked either to accept
(play) or reject the gamble within a maximum time of 4 s.
dopaminergic medication and depression in PD by assessing how these factors modulate the
parameters obtained from a model based on prospect theory. Within that framework, the sub-
jective utility of each gamble (SUG) can be approximated by the following equation:
SUG = pGain ×Gain− pLoss × Loss× λ,
where pGain is the gain probability, pLoss is the loss probability, Gain is the gain value of the
gamble, and Loss is the (absolute) loss value of the gamble. The relative weighting of gains
and losses is reﬂected in the loss aversion parameter λ. If λ > 1, then losses are overvalued
relative to gains: A person is loss averse. If λ < 1, then gains are overvalued relative to losses:
A person is loss seeking. If λ = 1, gains and losses are valued equally: A person is gain–loss
neutral.
A softmax function was used to estimate the probability of gamble acceptance based on
the subjective value of the gamble:
p(gamble acceptance) =
1
1+ e−µ(SUG+c)
.
This function includes two other parameters; an inverse temperature parameter (μ) and a
constant parameter (c). The constant parameter (c) reﬂects a value-independent gambling bias
toward or away from gambling. If c > 0, there is a tendency to accept gambles regardless of
their subjective utility. If c < 0, there is a tendency to reject gambles regardless of their subjec-
tive utility. The inverse temperature parameter reﬂects consistency of choice behavior. If μ = 0,
choices are random, whereas if μ is highly positive or negative, there is consistency in choice
behavior, with a positive μ representing higher gamble acceptance with higher gain and lower
loss value (and vice versa for negative μ). Model parameters were constrained as follows: From
Computational Psychiatry 16
Gambling in Parkinson’s Disease Timmer et al.
0 to 10 for the loss aversion parameter (λ) and the inverse temperature parameter (μ) and from
−10 to 10 for the value-independent gambling bias parameter (c). We anticipated μ to be
positive, consistent with a utility maximization strategy, where participants accept more gam-
bles when gain values increase and loss values decrease. None of the parameters obtained
from our participants reached these boundaries (except for the two patients who were ex-
cluded from the analysis; see “Exclusion”).
The model that we ﬁtted to the data assumes a linear valuation of gains and losses, in
contrast to the curvilinear value function of prospect theory. This is a common and reasonable
simplifying assumption given the relatively narrow range of gains and losses used in this pro-
tocol. We also assumed no subjective transformation of probabilities as described in prospect
theory and thus assumed equal weights for the 0.5 probability of gains and losses (De Martino,
Camerer, & Adolphs, 2010; Tom et al., 2007).
Exclusion
We assessed whether participants’ choices were inﬂuenced by gain and loss values in an ex-
pected manner, that is, whether participants were utility maximizers (accepting more gambles
with increasing gain values and accepting fewer gambles with increasing loss values). In-
spection of the individual response patterns revealed that two participants (one patient with
a depression [history] and one nondepressed patient) did not meet this a priori assumption,
suggesting a lack of understanding of task instructions. In both cases, this was during the ﬁrst
testing day. In one case, the response pattern revealed that the participant accepted more
gambles when gain values decreased and loss values increased, thereby unintentionally trying
to minimize earnings. During debrieﬁng, this participant realized that he had made a mis-
take. The responses of the other participant were suggestive of random choice behavior. In
both cases, these observations were conﬁrmed by negative temperature parameters (μ) ob-
tained from the model. These two patients were excluded from further analyses. Moreover,
two healthy controls were excluded from further analyses because of a lifetime history of de-
pression, while two PD patients with a depression (history) were excluded because they failed
to ﬁnish the study, leading to incomplete datasets.
Model Fitting and Comparison
We used a hierarchical Bayesian ﬁtting procedure to ﬁt the model to participants’ choices as
described by Huys and colleagues (Huys et al., 2011; Huys et al., 2012). This method estimates
the mean and variance of model parameters across all subjects and sessions. These parameters
then serve to deﬁne a normal a priori distribution for ﬁnding individual values of parameters for
each subject and session (i.e., posterior parameters). We hypothesized the a priori distributions
of the relevant parameters (the loss aversion parameter, λ, and the gambling bias parameter,
c) to be different for patients and healthy controls. Therefore we ﬁrst ﬁtted the model to pa-
tient data only. Note that any differences in posterior parameters between patient groups and
medication sessions cannot be attributed to parameter regularization employed during ﬁtting,
because individual parameters from both patient groups and both drug sessions were obtained
using the same a priori distribution (Huys et al., 2012). To compare PD patients with healthy
controls, we ﬁtted the model to healthy control and patient data together (separately for each
drug session).
The hierarchical Bayesian ﬁtting procedure is an iterative algorithm. In every iteration,
individual parameters are optimized based on the data and current estimation of the group
mean and variance. We used a Laplace approximation for deﬁning a normal approximation
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of individual posteriors, in which the maximum a posteriori values were found using non-
linear optimization methods (MATLAB optimization toolbox, fmincon routine, interior-point
algorithm). The group mean and variance are then updated according to obtained individual
posteriors (for equations, see Huys et al., 2012), which serve as group mean and variance in
the next iteration. The iterative updating of group and individual parameters continues un-
til changes in parameters are very small (i.e., a convergence criterion satisﬁed). Importantly,
convergence is guaranteed in this algorithm (Bishop, 2006).
A Bayesian model comparison was conducted to compare the model with three parame-
ters (λ, μ, and c) with a slightly simpler model, where we forced c to be zero, thereby reducing
the number of free parameters. This model assumed that subjects do not exhibit a value-
independent bias toward or away from gambling. A Bayesian model comparison assessed
which model best captured participants’ choices by computing model evidence by balancing
model ﬁts and model complexity (Kass & Raftery, 1995; Piray et al., 2014). A procedure was
employed that penalizes complexity by marginalizing over both group and individual param-
eters using Laplace approximation and the Bayesian information criterion, respectively. The
negative log-mode evidence (NLME) was computed as
NLME ≈ −∑
n
log P(Dn|θn)−∑
n
logN(θn|Θ,Σ)− 1
2
mN log 2π+
1
2∑n
log |Hn|+m log(N),
whereDn is the set of choice data for the nth participant; θn is the ﬁtted individual parameter for
the nth participant; Θ and Σ are the mean and variance for the group distribution, respectively;
m is the number of free parameters of the model; N is the number of participants; and |Hn|
is the determinant of the Hessian matrix of the log-posterior function at θn. The ﬁrst term on
the right-hand side of the equation refers to how well the model predicts data. The sum of the
next three terms together is the penalty due to individual parameters. The last term represents
the penalty approximated for 2m (mean and variance together) group parameters using the
Bayesian information criterion (Piray et al., 2014). The model with the lowest NLME is the best
model.
Statistical Analysis
First, we examined whether dopaminergic medication modulated loss aversion and/or gam-
bling bias parameters in nondepressed PD patients. Subsequently, we compared medication
effects on these parameters between nondepressed PD patients and PD patients with a depres-
sion (history). Finally, we compared patients’ data with those of age-matched controls, each
group and drug session separately. Because loss aversion and gambling bias parameters were
nonnormally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk, p < 0.05), we used two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank
tests to assess within-subject differences and Mann–Whitney tests to assess between-group
differences. Depression scores and proportion of accepted gambles, which were normally
distributed, were analyzed with a mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with drug as within-
subject and group as between-subject factor. Two-tailed Pearson correlations were used for
normally distributed data, and two-tailed Spearman correlations were used for nonnormally
distributed data. Furthermore, for nonnormally distributed data, we reported medians and
their standard errors. Standard errors of the median were computed using bootstrapping (Efron
& Tibshirani, 1993). By resampling with replacement of the original group sample, we created
105 new group samples. The standard error of the median was then deﬁned as the standard
deviation of all bootstrapped samples.
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RESULTS
Risky Choice and Drug Effects in Nondepressed Parkinson’s Disease (PD) Patients
Patient and disease characteristics are presented in Table 1. Median parameters obtained from
themodel (per group andmedication session) are presented in Table 2. Individual endowments
at the beginning of the experiment varied between participants (Table 1), as these were earnings
from a previous experiment performed the same day. However, there was no signiﬁcant main
effect of drug on earnings.
Using prospect theory–based analysis, we assessed the computational mechanisms
contributing to risky choice. The full model including a constant parameter (c; reﬂecting a gam-
bling response bias irrespective of the value of gambles) provided a better account of par-
ticipants’ choices than did a model without this parameter, indicated by a lower log-model
evidence (in patients, 4,102 compared with 4,374 for the model where c was forced to be
zero; in healthy controls, 1,099 compared with 1,131 for the model where c was forced to
be zero). Therefore reported results are based on parameters obtained from the full model.
First, we assessed medication effects on model parameters derived from risky choice patterns
in nondepressed PD patients.
Analysis of the value-independent gambling bias parameter (c) revealed negative param-
eters during both drug sessions (Table 2), indicating a tendency to avoid gambling
irrespective of the value of the gambles. Dopaminergic medication signiﬁcantly increased
the value-independent gambling propensity in nondepressed PD patients, Z = −2.65, p =
0.008 (Figure 2). There was no effect of dopaminergic medication on loss aversion (λ), Z =
−1.54, p = 0.12, and no effect on the inverse temperature parameter (μ), Z = −0.18, p = 0.86.
Moreover, there were no effects of medication dose (LED) and no session order effects.
Effect of Depression (History) in Parkinson’s Disease (PD)
Subsequently, we compared nondepressed PD patients and PD patients with a depression
(history). Again, individual endowments at the beginning of the task varied between partici-
pants (Table 1). There was no signiﬁcant main effect of Group or Drug and no Group × Drug
interaction on these earnings.
Table 2. Model parameters per group and drug session
OFF session ON session
Gambling response bias (c)
PD with a depression (history) −1.73 (14.9) −1.30 (13.8)
Nondepressed PD −2.71 (9.4) −1.05 (8.9)
Healthy controls −0.65 (11.1) –
Loss aversion (λ)
PD with a depression (history) 1.51 (3.0) 1.19 (2.7)
Nondepressed PD 1.01 (3.2) 1.16 (2.6)
Healthy controls 1.37 (2.8) –
Inverse temperature (µ)
PD with a depression (history) 0.93 (2.1) 0.94 (1.9)
Nondepressed PD 0.89 (1.5) 1.09 (2.2)
Healthy controls 1.06 (2.1) –
Note. Values represent median (range).
Computational Psychiatry 19
Gambling in Parkinson’s Disease Timmer et al.
Figure 2. Drug effects on value-independent gambling bias. Median value-independent gambling
bias parameter (c) per session (OFF session in dark gray; ON session in light gray) in nondepressed
PD patients. For illustration purposes, we also added the bars for PD patients with a depression
(history; OFF and ON sessions) and for healthy controls (OFF session). Error bars represent standard
errors of the median. ∗∗p < 0.01.
Analyses of the value-independent gambling bias parameter (c) revealed a near-signiﬁcant
Group×Drug interaction,U = 156, p = 0.07, indicating that dopaminergicmedication tended
to increase a value-independent gambling propensity to a greater extent in nondepressed PD
patients compared with PD patients with a depression (history). While the medication had
a clear effect on value-independent gambling propensity in nondepressed PD patients, as re-
ported previously, it had no effect in PD patients with a depression (history), Z = −0.087, p =
0.9. The main effect of Drug failed to reach signiﬁcance, Z = −1.78, p = 0.08. There was no
main effect of Group, U = 199, p = 0.44. There was no signiﬁcant correlation between drug
effects on value-independent gambling bias and current depression severity (BDI score).
Analyses of the loss aversion parameter (λ) revealed a signiﬁcant Group × Drug inter-
action, U = 149, p = 0.046. PD patients with a depression (history) exhibited greater drug-
induced decreases in loss aversion than nondepressed PD patients did. However, the simple
main effects of Drug were not signiﬁcant. There was a near-signiﬁcant simple main effect of
Group in the OFF state; patients with a depression (history) tended to be more loss averse
than nondepressed patients were, U = 151, p = 0.052. During the ON state, there was no
simple main Group effect, U = 215, p = 0.70. There was no overall main effect of Group,
U = 191, p = 0.33, and no overall main effect of Drug, Z = −0.21, p = 0.84 (Figure 3).
To visualize drug and group effects on loss aversion, we plotted, for each group and drug
session separately, the degree to which the ratio of rejecting to accepting gambles increased
as a function of increases in potential losses (raw data; Figure 4). To control for effects of
other factors, such as general drug effects on gambling rate, we plotted the ratio of rejecting
to accepting gambles as a function of relative loss differences between pairs of trials, while
effects of different gains were averaged out. A steeper slope indicates greater loss sensitivity.
From Figure 4, it is clear that dopaminergic medication had contrasting effects on loss aversion
in nondepressed PD patients and in PD patients with a depression (history).
Medication effects on loss aversion were predicted by current OFF-state depression
severity, ρ(41) = −0.348, p = 0.022. This correlation was due to greater drug-induced
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Figure 3. Drug effects on loss aversion. Median loss aversion parameter (λ) per group (non-
depressed PD patients and PD patients with a depression [history]) and drug session (OFF session
in dark gray; ON session in light gray). For illustration purposes, we also added the bar for healthy
controls (OFF session). Error bars represent standard errors of the median. ∗p < 0.05.
decreases in loss aversion in patients with higher current OFF-state depression scores (Figure 5A).
Moreover, drug effects on current depression scores correlated signiﬁcantly with drug effects
on loss aversion, ρ(41) = −0.384, p = 0.011, indicating greater drug-induced decreases in loss
aversion in patients with greater drug-induced decreases in depression scores. This corre-
lation was strong in patients with a depression (history), ρ(19) = −0.592, p = 0.005, but not
Figure 4. Loss sensitivity. The ratio of the number of rejected gambles divided by the number of
accepted gambles in log-space (y axis) as a function of the relative loss averaged across different
gain values (x axis) per group and per drug session. A steeper slope indicates greater loss sensitivity.
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Figure 5. Correlations between (drug effects on) loss aversion and depression. A) Correlation
between scores on the BDI during the OFF session (x axis) and drug effects on loss aversion (λ)
on the y axis (ON session score minus OFF session score) across PD patients with and without a
depression (history), ρ(41) = −0.384, p = 0.011. B) Correlation between drug effects on depression
scores on the x axis (BDI OFF session score minus ON session score) and drug effects on loss
aversion (λ) on the y axis (ON session score minus OFF session score). Patients with a depression
(history) are marked in red, ρ(19) = −0.592, p = 0.005, and nondepressed patients are marked in
blue, ρ(20) = −0.021, p = 0.93. This correlation was signiﬁcantly different between groups (Fisher
r-z transformation, z = −2.01, p = 0.044). Patients who screened positive for having an impulse
control disorder are marked with a yellow border.
signiﬁcant in the nondepressed patients, ρ(20) = −0.021, p = 0.93, and signiﬁcantly different
between groups (Fisher r-z transformation, z = −2.01, p = 0.044; Figure 5B).
There were no main effects of Drug, Z = −0.31, p = 0.75, or Group, U = 225, p = 0.88,
and there was no signiﬁcant Group × Drug interaction, U = 226, p = 0.90, on the inverse
temperature parameter (μ). There were no effects of LED, no session order effects, and no effects
of current ICD status on model parameters (value-independent gambling bias, loss aversion,
and inverse temperature parameter).
Mixed ANOVA of depression scores (BDI) demonstrated a signiﬁcant Group × Drug
interaction, F(1, 41) = 4.19, p = 0.047. Post hoc paired-sample t test revealed that this in-
teraction was due to a signiﬁcant drug-induced decrease in depression scores in patients
with a depression (history), t(20) = 2.19, p = 0.041, but not in nondepressed patients, t(21) =
−0.60, p = 0.56. There was also a main effect of Group, F(1, 41) = 17.26, p < 0.001, indicat-
ing signiﬁcantly higher depression scores in patients with a depression (history). There was no
main effect of Drug.
Five patients exhibited at least one ICD as assessed with the QUIP-RS rating scale (one
nondepressed patient and four patients with a depression [history]). None of them exhibited
gambling addiction.
Comparison with Healthy Controls
Relative to controls, nondepressed PD patients showed a signiﬁcantly lower value-independent
gambling bias during the OFF session, U = 111, p = 0.001, but not during the ON session,
U = 177, p = 0.08. This is consistent with the signiﬁcant effect of medication in the nonde-
pressed PD group, mentioned earlier. Relative to controls, PD patients with a depression (his-
tory) showed a signiﬁcantly lower value-independent gambling bias during the ON session,
U = 151, p = 0.033, but not during the OFF session, U = 160, p = 0.06. Note however that,
within this patient group, there was no signiﬁcant medication effect on the value-independent
gambling bias parameter.
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Relative to controls, median loss aversion parameter estimates were quite low in patients.
However, direct comparisons with controls revealed that this reduction was signiﬁcant only
in nondepressed PD patients OFF medication, U = 150, p = 0.019. The median loss aversion
parameter from nondepressed patients ON medication, U = 169, p = 0.056, and from PD pa-
tients with a depression (history) OFF, U = 228, p = 0.75, or ON medication, U = 176, p =
0.12, did not differ from that of controls. There were no differences in terms of the inverse
temperature parameter (μ) between controls and either group of PD patients (ON and OFF
medication).
Proportion of Accepted Gambles
In addition to the computational parameters underlying risky choice, we analyzed the pro-
portion of accepted gambles, which is a compound measure of risky choice. The proportion
of accepted gambles in PD patients with a depression (history) was 53.6% OFF medication
and 57.9% ON medication. In nondepressed PD patients, this was 56.3% OFF medication
and 60.2% ON medication. The proportion of accepted gambles in healthy controls was
62.2%. Mixed ANOVA in PD patients revealed no signiﬁcant Group × Drug interaction,
F(1, 41) = 0.01, p = 0.94, and no main effect of Group, F(1, 41) = 0.31, p = 0.58, or Drug,
F(1, 41) = 2.32, p = 0.136. The correlation between drug-induced increases in gamble ac-
ceptance and depression scores OFF medication failed to reach signiﬁcance, r(41) = 0.273,
p = 0.077. There was no signiﬁcant correlation between LED and drug-induced increases in
gamble acceptance, r(41) = 0.171, p = 0.27. Comparison of patients with healthy controls
(each patient group and drug session separately) revealed no signiﬁcant differences in gamble
acceptance.
DISCUSSION
The present study revealed two key ﬁndings. First, the data demonstrate that dopaminergic
medication increases a value-independent gambling bias in nondepressed PD patients, as it
does in healthy controls (Rigoli et al., 2016; Rutledge et al., 2015). This provides the third
piece of converging evidence for dopamine-induced increases in gambling bias and reinforces
the construct validity of this ﬁnding, also generalizing it across experimental paradigm and
across underlying theoretical framework. Indeed, dopamine-induced increases in a value-
independent gambling bias have now been shown using computational model-based analy-
ses grounded in reinforcement learning theory (Rutledge et al., 2015), mean-variance theory
(Rigoli et al., 2016), and prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Second, the present
data indicate that dopaminergic medication reduces loss aversion to a greater degree in PD
patients with higher current depression ratings. The ﬁnding that dopamine modulates the rela-
tive weighting of gains versus losses during risky choice concurs generally with current theories
about striatal dopamine’s role in valuation and choice (Collins & Frank, 2014) and raises the
hypothesis, to be addressed in future studies, that dopamine-related reductions in loss aversion
might underlie previously observed comorbidity between depression and medication-related
side effects in PD, such as ICDs.
The present study illustrates the power of a computational model-based approach to
analyze choice data. Indeed, the present study would have failed to reveal any of the effects
on risky choice, if we had not taken into account the prior theoretical insight that the proportion
of accepted gambles on tasks such as the one used here is a function of multiple parameters,
including a value-independent gambling bias and loss aversion. Our observation raises the
possibility that dopamine-induced increases in risky choice as measured previously using other
tasks in nondepressed PD patients (i.e., the Cambridge Gamble Task and the Game of Dice
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task; Brand et al., 2004; Cools et al., 2003; Euteneuer et al., 2009) also reﬂect increases in a
value-independent gambling bias.
Two previous studies (Rigoli et al., 2016; Rutledge et al., 2015) have reported dopamine-
induced changes in a value-independent gambling bias. Both studies involved administration
of an acute dose of levodopa to healthy volunteers, and both reported enhanced attraction to
gambling for gains. Unlike Rutledge et al. (2015), we show that the gambling bias extends
to gambles with mixed gains and losses, suggesting that the effect is not only value but also
valence independent. As has been suggested previously (Friston et al., 2013; Kakade & Dayan,
2002; Rigoli et al., 2016; Rutledge et al., 2015), the nonspeciﬁc attraction to gambling might
arise from an exploration bonus associated with surprising outcomes that potentiates informa-
tion, sensation, and novelty seeking (Dagher & Robbins, 2009; Norbury, Manohar, Rogers, &
Husain, 2013).
Based on the dopamine overdose hypothesis (Cools, 2006), we considered the hypothe-
sis that dopamine’s effects on gambling (biases) might be greater in nondepressed PD patients,
with putatively intact ventral striatal dopamine levels, than in patients with a depression (his-
tory), with putatively greater striatal dopamine deﬁciency. In fact, the comparison with controls
suggests that nondepressed PD patients exhibit an abnormally reduced gambling bias when
OFF medication rather than abnormally enhanced gambling bias when ON medication. This
clearly is not consistent with the overdose hypothesis, although it should be noted that our
design was not optimized for comparing patients with controls, who were tested only once in
the absence of medication. Perhaps more importantly, although there was a statistical trend
for a Group × Drug interaction, with marginally greater drug effects on value-independent
gambling bias for nondepressed than (previously) depressed patients, this effect did not actu-
ally reach signiﬁcance. Thus we provide no support for the hypothesis that medication effects
on gambling (bias) are greatest in patients with less affected dopamine levels. Of course, the
current study does not exclude the possibility that dopamine-induced increases in gambling
bias are absent in PD patients with more severe current depression.
Dopaminergic medication decreased loss aversion to a greater extent in PD patients with
a depression (history) than in nondepressed PD patients. However, the simple main effects of
drug were nonsigniﬁcant. This could reﬂect the heterogeneity of our sample of depressed pa-
tients. Indeed, a weakness of the current study is that we included PD patients with present
as well as past depression. However, it did allow us to investigate effects of current depres-
sion severity on mechanisms of risky choice. Correlation analyses revealed that dopamine-
induced decreases in loss aversion were related to current depression severity and to effects
of dopamine on depressive symptoms. Patients with the highest current depression scores and
the greatest beneﬁcial effect of dopaminergic medication on depression scores also exhibited
the greatest dopamine-induced decrease in loss aversion. This ﬁnding concurs with clinical
evidence indicating that PD patients who exhibit more severe depressive symptoms are at
increased risk for having ICD (Joutsa et al., 2012), although a strong link between (dopamine-
induced decreases in) loss aversion and ICD has yet to be established (Giorgetta et al., 2014;
Voon, Gao et al., 2011).
The effect of medication on the gambling bias in the nondepressed PD patients rep-
resents a conceptual replication, and accordingly, we have considerable conﬁdence in the
reproducibility of the effect, also given that it remained signiﬁcant after correcting for the mul-
tiple contrasts—(a) ON versus OFF in the nondepressed group and (b) nondepressed patients
versus patients with a depression (history). Conversely, the effect of depression on loss aversion
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was marginally signiﬁcant, particularly when taking into account the fact that multiple com-
parisons were conducted. Accordingly, we recommend that future studies aim to replicate this
effect of depression on loss aversion.
To conclude, the present ﬁndings suggest that previously observed increases in risky
choice in (nondepressed) PD patients on dopaminergic medication might reﬂect a value-
independent change in a gambling bias. Moreover, the present study raises the hypothesis,
to be addressed in future studies, that dopamine-induced reductions in loss aversion might
underlie previously observed comorbidity between depression and medication-related side
effects in PD, such as ICD.
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